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Abstract: This article focuses on the action of the Catalan deputies in the 
Spanish parliament during the First World War. It analyses the measures of pressure 
they developed in relation to social and economic consequences of the conflict, the 
evolution of their position in the debate between pro-allies and pro-central powers, 
as well as the parliamentary speeches about political and economic autonomy for 
Catalonia. Although the option of deciding on neutrality was widespread among 
Catalans, there was no unitary position. On the contrary, Catalan politicians joined 
for other reasons. They wanted to protect not only from the negative impact of war 
and profit from its benefits, but also they wish to take advantage of the situation to 
make visible, in an international sphere, their willingness to obtain the political 
autonomy for their region. Despite Catalan demands for autonomy found no 
concessions, the international context and the requests that had been made helped to 
visualize the so-called Catalan question. The Spanish Congress and the country on 
the whole were completely weakened after the war. However, the expectation for 
change and regeneration was closer than ever as the First World War had 
accelerated the crisis of the political system of the Restoration. 
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Introduction 
Recalling Stefan Zweig’s nostalgic consideration, between 1914 and 1918 that 
“golden age of security” Europe had lived until then vanished.1 Whereas confronted 
countries fought unscrupulous in the battlefield, neutral territories such as Spain 
enjoyed a golden age similar as it would be the “Happy Twenties”, and postponed a 
fictitious “security” while that world was falling apart. This was the case of 
Catalonia, and specifically Barcelona, which in many ways became the capital of 
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Europe: “It was opened to the world and the world opened up to the city, which 
welcomed with open arms all those men who would approached it... while things 
worked, all pursued themselves into risky ventures, rampant consumption, 
speculation and intemperate amusements... but when it all returned to normality 
after the end of the war and belligerent countries recovered their entrepreneurship, 
the bubble deflated and Spanish exports plummeted. All the money that has been 
made disappeared, as well as traders, spies, refugees, actresses, musicians and 
artists.”2 This was the second gold rush Barcelona and Catalonia lived since 1871-
1885, a period of economic prosperity based on the benefits of wine export, taking 
advantage of the devastation caused by phylloxera in French grapevines, until the 
end of the conflict forced to face the new reality. 
Spanish neutrality involved several windfall profits, mainly in the textile 
industry, which exported goods worth to 14,420 tons between 1915 and 1920. In 
other words, exportations doubled in comparison with the period 1906-1910 (6,919 
tons). This was the macroeconomic aspect of the impact the war had on the Catalan 
society, while the cost of living raised and originated an intense social conflict. 
Another aspect was the social division between pro-allies, primarily Francophiles, 
and supporters of the Central Powers, which resulted in a real war of opinion (or 
“civil war of the spirits”3). In both sides were involved intellectuals, journalists, 
writers and artists, as well as politicians, including the MPs. 
Basically, what was being discussed was the future of the Spanish nation, 
between decay and regeneration: the Spanish state could declare itself neutral, but 
not their nation, prostrated since the loss of the last colonies in 1898. This was one 
of the central arguments of the Manifesto’s adhesion to the Allies, written by 
intellectuals linked to the generation of 1914, heiress of regeneration, on 9 July 
1915.4 A few months later, supporters of the Germans, mainly from the Maurist 
Party and the Traditionalist Party, published as well their manifesto, Spanish-
German Friendship, in which the emphasis laid on values expressed by 
Wilhelminism that could also be patterns of behaviour for Spain, such as authority, 
order and strength of the state.5 
In this debate appeared two political regeneration projects: the triumph of 
civilization and democracy, sustained by French republican values and Britain’s 
parliamentarism and, on the other hand, the one supported by the authoritarian, 
clerical and military principles of the Central Powers. In the first block joined 
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republicans, dynastic liberals and socialists, besides part of the conservative Catalan 
nationalism and left-wing Catalan nationalists; while, in the second, mainly most of 
the right-wing, traditionalists and maurists conservatives, some dynastic liberals, 
some members of the Catalan Regionalist League, the Catholic press, the 
aristocracy, the army, the church and the king himself.6 
In Catalonia, as early as the 27 November 1914 was signed a manifesto in favour 
of neutrality, the Friends of the Europe moral fight’s Manifesto. Later, in April 
1915, appeared the magazine Iberia, together with Madrid’s publication España the 
key figures of the allies’ intelligentsia. They received subsidies from the British and 
the French governments, so they became instruments of their propaganda in Spain.7 
In addition, the Catalans made an extra effort, providing nearly 12,000 volunteers, 
according to a speech of the MP Emmanuel Brousse in the French National 
Assembly, to the French army.8 Germanophiles also had their own platforms to 
spread their political culture in Spain: the magazine Germania and the Germania’s 
Friends’ Committee, formed in Barcelona in late 1916 with the presence of 
noucentist intellectuals close to the Catalan nationalist Enric Prat de la Riba. 
Most Spanish politicians were in favour of neutrality. From the perspective of 
the King Alfonso XIII, acting as a mediator for the peace, this position would allow 
an improvement of the state’s external image.9 In diplomatic parameters, Spain was 
closer to Entente’s powers rather than to the central ones. It was a fact, with the 
conversion of the Spanish state in “neutral ally”, practicing dynamic neutrality.10 
However, the neutrality was an obligated one, which expressed an objective 
impotence, caused by the economic and military weakness, which prevented Spain 
from being a contender in the war. 
Despite the ideological variances and the different positions towards the war, it 
was the pragmatism of Catalan politicians who led their performance. Just a day 
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7 The magazine was founded on the 10 April 1915 and lasted until the 22 February 1919. It was the 
informal structure of the Brotherhood’s Committee with the Catalan volunteers. In this respect, Joan 
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“voluntaris Catalans” a la Gran Guerra (1914-1918) (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de 
Montserrat, 1991); Joan Esculies and David Martínez Fiol, 12,000! Els Catalans a la Primera 
Guerra Mundial (Barcelona: Ara Llibres, 2013). 
9 King Alfonso XIII personally took charge of organizing an assistance office for the victims of the 
war. 
10 Albert Mousset, La política exterior de España, 1873-1918 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1918). 
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before the declaration of neutrality made by the Prime Minister, the conservative 
Eduardo Dato, Catalan institutions reacted immediately. The president of the 
Catalan Commonwealth, a structure that unified the four Catalan provincial 
councils since April 1914 in order to obtain certain political autonomy, summoned 
corporations and Catalan MPs in an Economic Board, on 6 August 1914. Prat de la 
Riba, initially in favour of the Central Powers, had the aim to pressure the 
government to adopt extraordinary measures, as it had already been done in other 
countries, so as to regulate credit restrictions, deactivate obstructions to export and 
compete to achieve a free port in Barcelona. Therefore, the Catalan political and 
economic elites were soon on guard in consequence of the fear generated by the fall 
of the Paris stock exchange on 27 July, which involved the closure of the stock 
exchanges in Barcelona. 
At this juncture, Catalan politicians wanted to protect not only from the negative 
impact of war and profit from its benefits, but also took advantage of the situation 
to make visible, in an international sphere, their willingness to obtain the political 
autonomy for their region. They wanted to transform the structure of the state into a 
federal republic or a confederation, including, if needed, Portugal. In the words of 
Claudi Ametlla, director of the pro-allies magazine Iberia, “give universality to our 
cause”, convinced that only in a Europe dominated by the Allies powers it could be 
recognized the freedom of Catalonia.11 This mission required a deep democratic 
regeneration of the political system of the Restoration, which since 1876 was 
governed by corruption and influences and was also monopolized by two parties, 
the Liberals and the Conservatives, who took turns in the power thanks to the 
moderating power of the Crown, an authority conferred by the 1876’s 
Constitution.12 Although these circumstances had not perished in the eve of 1914, 
they come up against increasing difficulty, given the profound decomposition of the 
dynastic parties, and the limited influence of the major opposition parties, socialists 
and republicans, besides the minority traditionalist deputies. 
Despite the implementation of the universal male suffrage in 1890 – also during 
the Democratic six-year period (1868-1874) –, in 1914 most of Spain was under the 
electoral government interference. Maybe Catalonia was one of the few Spanish 
regions which had distanced itself from this reality, especially after the general 
election of 1907. Then, the majority of the Catalan political parties joined in a 
single electoral candidacy, Catalan Solidarity, which won 41 of the 44 seats 
Catalan districts sent to Congress of Deputies (10.75% of the 409 total seats).13 
                                                   
11 Claudi Ametlla, “Catalunya davant la Guerra Europea”, La Revista 18 (1916), 7. 
12 Expressions referenced by Dieter Nohlen in analysing Restoration’s political system. Dieter Nohlen, 
“Ideas sobre gobierno parlamentario y práctica constitucional en la España de la época del Estatuto 
Real (1833-1837)”, Revista de Estudios políticos 62 (1968), 93-120. 
13 The 44 seats were distributed as it follows: 7 came from the district of Barcelona, 3 from the district 
of Tarragona-Reus-Falset, 13 from the provincial demarcation of Barcelona, 8 from the one of 
Lleida, 8 from the one of Girona and 5 from the one of Tarragona. In those years, Catalonia had 
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During the Great War there were three great legislature periods: 1914-1915, 
1916-191814 and 1918-1919. Bearing in mind the mandate repetitions and according 
to the 1907 electoral law were chosen a total of 80 MPs from the Catalan districts 
and circumscriptions, by a one-person vote in the first ones and by a majority plural 
vote in the second ones. The table 1 shows the distribution of the Catalan MPS, in 
consonance with their political affiliation: 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the Catalan deputies according to their political 
militancy (1916-1919) 
Political militancy Total number Percentage (%) 
Regionalist League (Lliga 
Regionalista) 
28 35% 
Nationalist republican 13 16.25% 
Reformist party 4 5% 
Radical republican 3 3.75% 
Federal republican 2 2.5% 
Subtotal republicans 22 27.5% 
Dynastic conservative 8 10% 
Maurist Party 4 5% 
Subtotal dynastic conservative 12 15% 
Dynastic liberal 12 15% 
Liberal Left-wing  3 (2) 3.75% 
Subtotal dynastic liberal 15 18.75% 
Subtotal dynastic parties 27 33.75% 
Traditionalist party 3 3.75% 
Spanish Socialist Worker Party 
(PSOE)  
2 (1) 2.5% 
Total 82 100% (from 80) 
 
Source: Compiled from the database of the Catalan MPs, the History of 
Parliamentarism Group (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), and Josep Armengol 
and Gemma Rubí, Vots, electors i corrupció. Una reflexió sobre l’apatia a 
Catalunya, 1868-1923, (Barcelona: Abadia de Montserrat, 2012). The total number 
of the deputies considered is 82, because in the course of the period studied two 
changes of political militancy occurred: the nationalist republican Joaquim 
Salvatella, who joined the liberal left-wing led by Santiago Alba – a fraction of the 
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700,000 inhabitants. 
14 This one was divided into two different periods: 1916 and 1917-1918. 
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dynastic Liberal Party – and the federal republican Joan Baptista Anton Salas, who 
joined PSOE. Both changes happened at the end of the period studied.15 
 
As this table evidences, the first party in the legislatures considered was the 
Regionalist League (Lliga Regionalista), the conservative nationalist political force 
which won in 1918 the electoral and parliamentary majority in Catalonia. Taken 
together the different factions of the dynastic system, conservative and liberal, the 
dynastic deputies occupied the second position with the 33.75% of the seats. 
However, the number of republicans, joined with the main opposition party in 
Catalonia, the Regionalist League, together accounted for 68.75%. Yet, without 
forgetting the Regionalist League benefited from its accession into the liberal 
concentration government, formed because of the summer’s 1917 political and 
social crisis. On that occasion, the Catalan nationalist party headed a parliamentary 
assembly, which tried unsuccessfully to open a constitutional process to find a 
reformist and not revolutionary solution, wanted by the labour movement, to the 
collapse of the political system. 
In short, the anti-dynastic parties, the right, the Regionalist League, the left and 
the republican parties, with a significant presence of the progressive nationalism, 
represented almost a third of the representatives designated in Catalonia. It was a 
very different reality compared to the rest of the monarchy, as the dynastic parties 
still prevailed, despite the rise of socialist and republicans. Thus, the lower house 
was dominated by dynastic parties -fragmented and with complications to get 
unified leaderships-, which controlled nearly 90% of the seats between 1914 and 
1923. 
With this article we aim to fill a historiographical gap on the action of the 
Catalan deputies in reference to the neutrality position adopted by the Spanish 
governments. We are also going to analyse the measures of pressure developed and 
the evolution of their position in the debate between pro-allies and pro-central 
powers, a prolific discussion in the streets, in the press and also in the 
parliament.16Although the different Spanish governments tried to avoid this debate, 
                                                   
15 We express our thanks to Núria Rius, technician of the Grup d’Història del Parlamentarisme 
(History of Parliamentarism Group), who has arranged the data from the MPs elected during the 
period of the Great War. The results we present here come from an ongoing investigation about the 
actions of the Catalan MPs between 1810 and 1939. The working team, which signs this article, is 
composed by the director of the group, Borja de Riquer, the Professor Gemma Rubí and the PhD 
students Laura Canalias and Oriol Luján, who work under the supervision of the alluded professors. 
16 A historiographical balance on Spanish neutrality in World War I, focusing on international 
relations, Rubén Domínguez Méndez, “La Gran Guerra y la neutralidad española: entre la tradición 
historiográfica y las nuevas líneas de investigación”, Spagna Contemporanea 34 (2008), 27-44;  
Gerald H. Meaker, “A Civil War of Words: The Ideological Impact of the First World War on 
Spain, 1914-1918”, Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923, ed. Hans Schmitt, 
(The University of Virginia Press, 1988), 1-65. The most current bibliography on the subject, Javier 
Ponce, “Spanish Neutrality during the First World War”, in Caught in the Middle: Neutrals, 
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since it could add more instability to the fragile dynastic politics -little had been 
done to integrate the new mass movements to the constitutional order-, the impact 
of the Great War in the parliament still remains as an unexplored field. 
Consequently, we focus on two mainly aspects. First, on the political position of the 
deputies. That is, their alignment in the debate of neutrality and political 
regeneration. Secondly, on the parliamentary speeches about political and economic 
autonomy for Catalonia. 
We are aware that the current historiography is renewing both the analysis of the 
Spanish foreign policy and the cultural history of the war, concentrating on the 
involvement of the intellectuals through the study of the press and their manifestos. 
The historiography is also giving importance to a wide range of actors’ action, but 
we still miss publications about the specific role of the parliament in these debates. 
From this point of view, we want to fill a part of this gap by analysing the 
performance of the Catalan deputies during the First World War. 
 
The Main Issues aroused Catalan MPs’ Interest 
Before addressing the main issues, we are going to refer to the political 
structuring of the Catalan deputies, who were divided into three major 
parliamentary minorities, as the groups were not allowed. The most important one 
was the Regionalist League, which always acted with a great inner discipline and 
following a well-defined strategy. Secondly, we find the Republican-Socialist 
minority, integrating republicans and socialists from all ideologies. The Catalan 
republican nationalists followed the dictates of the political conjunction or acted on 
their own. Finally, the traditionalist minority, which proceeded relatively alone, and 
the Reformist party, which tended to provide support to the Republicans. These 
were the anti-dynastic minorities. The dynastic block was always more passive than 
these minorities and they did not have the habit of involving in the debates of the 
Parliament. However, when it was convenient for the Catalan territorial interests, 
they interceded collectively. 
Concerning the management of the Spanish parliament, it must be remembered 
that until 1919 the lower house did not act according to the standards of rationalized 
parliamentarism, via standing committees shaped in consonance with the subjects 
                                                                                                                                  
Neutrality during the First World War, eds. Johan Der Hertog and Samuel Kruizinga (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2011),53-66; Miguel Martorell, “"No fue aquello solamente una 
guerra. Fue una revolución": España y la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Historia y Política 26 (2011), 
17-45; Javier Ponce Marrero, “La política exterior española de 1907 a 1920: entre el 
regeneracionismo de intenciones y la neutralidad condicionada”, Historia contemporánea 34 
(2007), 93-115; from a cultural point of view, Maximiliano Fuentes Codera, España en la Primera 
Guerra Mundial. Una movilización cultural, (Madrid: Akal Editores, 2014); taking into account 
diplomacy and espionage, Fernando García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra. Espías, diplomáticos 
y traficantes (Madrid: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2014), and Eduardo González Calleja and Paul Aubert, 
Nidos de espías (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2014). 
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each ministerial department addressed. Instead, the deputies were distributed into 
sections, a small replica of the congress’composition and in special commissions, 
where drafts were discussed before being debated in the whole parliament.17 
The first legislature considered began on the 8 March 1914 and ended in 
December 1915 with the resignation of the Prime Minister, the conservative 
Eduardo Dato. The second legislature initiated with the fulfilment of the dynastic 
turn, since the new government was led by the liberal Count Romanones, who ruled 
the country until 1918. The summer of 1917’s crisis caused a new change in the 
administration. Then, it was constituted a concentration government managed by 
the liberal Manuel García Prieto, which included two politicians of the Regionalist 
League. This cabinet was followed by another one of concentration chaired by the 
conservative Antonio Maura. Like the first, it also failed in the attempt to assure the 
viability of the political system, leading it to a profound crisis and to an increasing 
separation with popular aspirations. 
Along those years, the role of the Catalan MPs was quite active. They were 
involved in classic issues as the controversy between protectionism and free trade, 
always attempting to protect the textile manufacturing; and in other matters, such as 
the electoral fraud and the administrative corruption or the colonial problem in the 
protectorate of Morocco, among others. 
In overall, there are three main issues that concerned Catalan MPs’ attention 
during and as a result of the First World War: the position in relation to the war, 
social and economic consequences which implied the confrontation, especially for 
the population, and the desire to achieve major economic and political autonomy. 
Issues, on the other hand, not only confined in the Catalan domain, but also of 
international concern. 
First of all, the position in relation to the war was a big matter that soon aroused 
the attention of Catalan MPs. Although the option of deciding on neutrality was 
widespread among Catalans, there was no unitary position, neither among the 
society nor between their representatives in the Congress.18 In fact, Catalan 
                                                   
17 The most complete work about the Spanish parliament of those years, Con luz y taquígrafos. El 
Parlamento en la Restauración (1913-1923), ed. Mercedes Cabrera (Madrid: Taurus, 1998). 
18 For a contextualization of the Spanish position in the conflict, Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Spain, 
1914-1918: Between war and revolution (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 5-26; 
Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, The Foundations of Civil War. Revolution, Social Conflict and 
Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916-1923 (New-York: Rouledge, 2008); Enrique Moradiellos, “La 
política europea (1898-1939)”, Ayer 49 (2003), 55-80; Javier Maestro, “Germanófilos y aliadófilos 
en la prensa obrera madrileña, 1914-1918”, in La sociedad madrileña durante la Restauración, 
1876-1931, eds. Ángel Bahamonde Magro and Luis Enrique Otero Carvajal (Madrid: Cidur, 1989), 
vol. 2, 319-332; Ron M. Carden, German policy toward neutral Spain, 1914-1918 (New York: 
Garlan Pub, 1987); about the division of Catalan positions, Maximiliano Fuentes Codera, 
“Proyectos contrapuestos para el catalanismo frente a la Primera Guerra Mundial: lecturas 
comparadas de La Veu de Catalunya y El Poble Català (1914-1915)”, in Ayeres en discusión. Temas 
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representatives were divided in two clearly differentiated groups. On the one hand, 
the Regionalist League preferred neutrality,19 following the principles of the 
Spanish government. With this strategy, the party hoped for economic and political 
benefits, both for the faction and for Catalonia. Francesc Cambó, for instance, made 
it clear: “It is no secret for anybody the regionalist minority’s viewpoint, on whose 
behalf I am addressing to you right now. We have always defended that the attitude 
of absolute neutrality in the conflict that is devastating the whole Europe is the one 
which was imposed by patriotism, convenience and even necessity; so whatever 
keeps Spain in that attitude of neutrality, adopted from the beginning by the 
Government, will count with our applause, and in that way the government can 
count on our cooperation.”20 
In opposition, republicans of the UFNR, which took part in the elections in 
coalition with the Radicals of Lerroux through the union agreed in Sant Gervasi’s 
Pact, as well as the socialist-republican conjunction, were leaning toward the allies. 
Other politicians from state parties, such as the Reformist Party, also added to the 
allies’ option.21 
Initially, socialists were in favour of neutrality, but as time went by they opted 
for the allies. They were influenced by ideological affinities and also because of the 
German indiscriminate submarine war campaign, which destroyed 20% of the 
Spanish merchant marine. Julià Nougués, one of its spokesmen, made it explicit in 
the Congress during a debate about merchant ships torpedoing: “Up to now, 
honourable members, have been torpedoed 18 Spanish ships, for a total amount of 
more than 80.000 tons of our merchant marine and this, added to the loss of other 
boats, which whether have been sunk by mines or other accidents or have been 
torpedoed, raises to the number of 110.000 tones the ones that has been lost from 
the beginning of the war […] I dare say to the Foreign Minister and to my country I 
do not know what would be better, whether to continue in this state of things or 
going to another situation with all the disadvantages that implied the option of being 
able to defend ourselves in one way or another.”22 This German attack led the pro-
allies sectors to adopt an attitude against Germans, which resulted in the formation 
of an antigerman league in January 1917. 
The socialist-republican minority was very belligerent with governmental 
attitude of neutrality’s imposition and brought the question to the Congress in order 
to debate it, because the executive have refrained from a public discussion in every 
                                                                                                                                  
clave de Historia Contemporánea hoy: IX Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, 
eds. Encarna Nicolás and Carmen González (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2008). 
19 Actually, within the regionalist party the position towards the war was diverse, from the initial 
Germanophilia of Prat de la Riba to the Francophilia of Rahola, Carner or Lluís Duran i Ventosa. 
20 Sessions of the Congress of the Deputies Diary (SCD): 1914-15’s legislature, 2139. 
21 About the party’s position throughout the conflict, Manuel Suárez Cortina, El partido reformista, 
1912-1931 (PhD diss., Universidad de Cantabria, 1985), 353-384. 
22 SCD: 1916’s legislature, 3997-3998. 
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moment. In any case, the Prime Minister Romanones’ Count avoided any 
possibility of dialogue. He did not want to discuss it in the parliament, as he initially 
was secretly and diplomatically favouring the Central Powers. Yet, he was about to 
end with neutrality in favour of the Entente, a predisposition which led to the 
government fall.23 In fact, the previous conservative government, leaded by Dato, 
had banned all public meetings that could discuss about the position of Spain in the 
war. The internal divisions within the Spanish society in relation to the position to 
adopt, despite the official neutrality, were widespread in other states of Europe. For 
instance, in countries such as Greece, which moved from neutrality to the Entente.24 
Indeed, the declaration of neutrality did not always respond to an effective vocation 
of equanimity.25 
The public inhibition showed by the Spanish governments in managing the 
effects of the war stimulated Catalan MPs’ critics. They condemned the attitude 
because of the harmful economic consequences that implied for the population. 
Cambó expressed this thought: “with this inhibition the government was once 
successful, so they believed that inhibition’s policy should lead their entire policy; 
but if we can inhibit in politics, we cannot do it in economic terms […] Tomorrow, 
a closing one, will raise in Spain the problem of hunger, and it will raise it for 
Spain, or aggravate it, because it has been already raised, the problem of lack of 
credit, as the old channels which stimulated its circulation have been destroyed 
without creating new ones, and the problem of unemployment, and in the distance a 
problem, the worst of all, which requires the preparation of the government in 
advance, are the economic consequences of the peace.”26 
Certainly, Catalan deputies considered and discussed about the effects of the war 
among civil society. That was, the shortage of essential goods and the resulting 
damage to the common people. The republican-socialist minority and the 
republicans of the UFNR were especially sensitive to this dramatic situation, but the 
words of Cambó showed they were not the only political parties concerned. For 
instance, Nougués requested government’s intervention to limit the price of some 
basic goods and avoid, as far as possible, the harmful effects of the subsistence 
problems.27 Moreover, Josep Zulueta tried to raise MPs awareness of the penalties 
which suffered the population as a consequence of the war, starting with the stock 
market crisis which led to unemployment.28 Not to mention the preoccupation of the 
                                                   
23 Romero Salvadó, Spain, 60-84. 
24 George B. Leontaritis, Greece and the First World War: from Neutrality to Intervention, 1917-1918 
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conservative Enric Sagnier for a typhus epidemic in the city of Barcelona and the 
requirement to take sanitary measures.29 
Fundamentally, to face the negative impact of the war, on what most Catalan 
representatives agreed was the need to ensure the access to bread, as an essential 
good, to the whole population. From the Regionalist League, towards the exposition 
made  by Camps’ Marquis of the problems generated in purchasing bread by its 
high price,30 to the republican-socialist minority and also to the republicans of the 
UFNR (Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana/Republican Nationalist Federal 
Union), all agreed on the diagnosis. Marcel·lí Domingo, for example, adverted to 
the absence of flour some towns of Barcelona’s province had31 and Joan Salas 
Antón submitted an interpellation about subsistence problems.32 
So many pressures became eventually decisive in order to persuade the 
government to approve a law, which meant the control of the state over comestibles 
and raw material’s importation. The decision was welcomed by the republican Salas 
Antón, as he foresaw the text would avoid famine and excessive hoarding of 
provisions by individuals,33 whereas representatives of Regionalist League such as 
Josep Bertran i Musitu or Joan Ventosa were much more critical. They were fearful 
of excessive government control over materials that could have an effect on 
agriculture and industry.34 
As Johan den Hertog and Samuël Kruizinga has exposed, all neutral countries 
were involved in the war owing to the economic effects of the warfare. It was a 
conflict that settled the access to markets and raw materials, in which countries had 
to adapt their economy in relation to the new conditions if they wanted to overcome 
it.35 If the neutrality in the Spanish case was almost imposed by its weak strategic 
and diplomatic position, in other situations of neutrality, such as in Argentina, the 
economic benefits were much higher, supplying foodstuff and valuable raw 
materials to the Entente while asserting its international position so as not 
completely cut trade relations with Germany, against British desires.36 
Finally, the third issue that concerned Catalan MPs was the fight for the 
autonomy of Catalonia. They contemplated it in economic terms, but also and 
especially in political terms.37 Along these lines, historiography has tended to relate 
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the position of neutrality during the war, defended by the Regionalist League, as a 
strategy to gain the autonomy. This tactic can be explained by the will to obtain a 
greater scope for economic action; a new step that would lead to a considerable 
profit from establishing neutral zones and a free port in Barcelona.38 Indeed, the 
claim for a free port located in Barcelona was not only requested by the Regionalist 
League politicians, but also by most of the Catalan representatives. Discourses such 
as the one pronounced by the socialist-republican Pere Coromines proved it: “we 
have a vigorous position to take part in this commercial concurrence; it must 
evidence it we have raised in our sea shores the most important city in the 
Mediterranean; Barcelona is the city with largest population in the Mediterranean; 
behind our city exists the most powerful commercial and industrial area. Here is the 
urgency of our request.”39 
The necessity of a free port in Barcelona, as had been previously granted to 
Cádiz, was seen as a chance to cope with the negative economic features of the war 
and profit from the opportunities the conflict was providing. 
On the other hand, the strategy followed by the Regionalist League should 
culminate with parliamentary obstruction, in order to weaken the monarchical 
governments, make their own way to power and facilitate political autonomy.40 
Once again, the claim for political autonomy cannot only be confined to the 
requests of this political party. Even the representative of the socialist-republican 
minority Marcel·lí Domingo censured it in the Parliament, during his speech about 
the petition for Catalonia’s autonomy: “One of the mistakes made when judging the 
problem of Catalonia, is to assign it only and exclusively to the performance of the 
Regionalist League, at the representation of the Regionalist League. No. The 
Regionalist League is not Catalonia; The Regionalist League cannot speak itself 
alone on behalf of Catalonia; Catalan nationalist’s aspirations are not the aspirations 
which are only authorized by the body of the Regionalist League.”41 
Therefore, these mainstreaming demands of economic and political autonomy, 
made by the Catalan deputies during the war, often not sufficiently analysed from 
this point of view, will lead us to a more detailed analysis we will address 
immediately. This reality must be contextualized in a moment of European internal 
boundaries redefinition, where the old empires declined and nations without state 
emerged, boosted by the call to self-determination recognized in the famous 
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Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points, which were considered as a program for European 
reconstruction after the conflict.42 
 
The Claim for Autonomy 
The European conflagration became a catalyst that propelled the Catalan 
nationalists to reopen their demands for political and economic sovereignty. In fact, 
Cambó qualified this war stage as: “a magnificent and epic age for all the countries 
in the world, where everything has been renewed.”43 This expectation for change 
and regeneration was precisely one of the main motivations that drove the 
conservative Catalans and Catalan nationalist republicans to make inquiries, 
amendments and speeches in order to make the necessity to renew the political 
system and give more autonomy to the regions understood by the government. 
It became clear with the amendment the Regionalist League presented on 7 June 
1916 relative to the reply’s draft to the message of the crown. Cambó, in charge of 
defending the proposal, argued the Spanish state needed to decentralize powers to 
solve the sterility and ineffectiveness in which it was. He also wanted to indicate the 
“Catalan problem” was not merely an administrative claim, it went beyond. He 
clarified it was an identity problem, which had aroused because the Catalan existed 
as a distinctive personality from the Spanish nationality. Finally, he said the 
question was not going to be solved until the Spanish government recognized the 
Catalan nationality with all its consequences and potential benefits, otherwise it 
would trigger new conflicts: “It exists, of course, the Catalan town, which has a 
history, which has segregated from its own substance a language, which has also 
segregated a law, which has different characters and its owns. It will be a good or a 
bad thing it exists in Spain, but it exists; and it does not depend on the fact of its 
existence to be a good or a bad thing, but rather on the treatment it receives. 
According to the treatment it can be an encouragement, a protector stimulus. 
According to the treatment given, it is the source of a constant struggle, of an every 
day’s fight which weakens us all and harms us all.”44 
A few days after, the amendment was also supported by Felip Rodés and 
Marcel·lí Domingo, republicans and nationalists. Both claimed, as the Regionalist 
League had previously requested, more autonomy for Catalonia on the benefit of 
the entire state. In fact, it was common to find examples of collaboration between 
regionalists and republican nationalists in diverse petitions of autonomy made 
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between 1916 and 1917, as the one related to the use of the Catalan language within 
the Principality and different complaints about the loss of purchasing power in 
provincial and town councils because of the centralization.45 Even in the economic 
field, where usually the Regionalist League took the initiative, republicans were not 
left behind. As Rodés admitted, his political party had learned from the 
conservative Catalan nationalist to be pragmatic when defending sovereignty 
interests: “precisely from the men of the Regionalist League we have learned to be 
opportunist in these matters of material interest, as well as in all other matters of 
political interest for Catalonia we are opportunists, we are pragmatists.”46 Even 
representatives of the liberal and conservative parties, such as Alfons Sala Argemí, 
Enric Sagnier or Enric Turull, gave speeches, which distanced themselves from 
their parties in order to obtain concessions in the economic field. 
It is precisely this aspect of economic sovereignty petitions, as well as political 
ones, we wish to emphasize in this article, as the Catalan deputies were very active 
in this respect. Since its foundation in 1901, the Regionalist League defended the 
interests of Catalan industry in a Spain dominated by agricultural concerns. The 
nationalist party received also support from other Catalan MPs of other parties, 
except from the radical republicans. It was especially during the First World War 
these claims were most heard in the parliament. Thus, the majority of the Catalan 
politicians defended and wanted to revalue the Catalan industry to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the war, since their products were required by the 
belligerent states. If Spain took advantage of it, the country could place itself in a 
good financial position. 
In 1914 Cambó argued that while neutrality was inevitable, it had to be given 
economic content to get a better international position after the war. Therefore, he 
reasoned it was necessary to encourage industry and provide Barcelona with a free 
port to trade in the Mediterranean, since the blockade of German ports and thus 
their maritime’s trade weakening would increase the international trade within that 
sea. This proposal was initially postponed.47 Later on, he predicted damage to 
Spain, if his demands of economic renewal were not accomplished: “It will occur 
something unheard of, dear Deputies, that Spain will be defeated without fighting, 
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that we will pay the consequences of war in greater proportion than those who have 
been belligerent; that Spain, in the settlement of the war pays, if not in territories, in 
something that is also part of national integrity, in wealth and arms that will leave 
Spain, for not having been able to give them employment.”48 
On that account, Lluís Sedó and Joan Ventosa, from the same political party, 
argued that the Spanish banking and industry needed an expansion if they wanted to 
take profit from the neutrality. So, apart from requesting a free port for Barcelona, 
they demanded the formation of banks for national saving and strengthening of the 
industry, trade and agriculture with more credit, as well as an opportunity to 
improve infrastructures and roads. 
Corominas and Nougués, nationalist republicans, also requested a free port and 
the renovation of the roads, which they considered essential to thrive.49 Meanwhile, 
Turull and Sala, from the Liberal Conservative Party, demanded measures to 
stimulate the importation of raw materials and the exportation of manufactured 
goods. As two industrial cities representatives, Sabadell and Terrassa, but especially 
as owners of wool factories, they needed to defend the interests of the Catalan 
industrialists against the views of their party. Their interventions on the 23th 
November 1914 made it clear: they called for the liberalization of the wool market, 
as the shortage of this product caused many companies could not produce. 
Specifically, Sala argued that foreign trade was the cause of the national richness, 
but never the source. Therefore, they wanted to promote national industry and 
strengthen the internal market, providing facilities to the industries so they could 
produce more.50 In fact, they had a great interest, since they made blankets for the 
army. 
 Despite the efforts, the measures proposed by the Catalan deputies were not 
reached. Both Castilian and Aragonese agrarians and the suspension of 
parliamentary sessions between February 1915 and May 1916 played against their 
wills. In fact, the closure of the Congress and the lack of economic adaptation to the 
international conflict reveal the particularity of the Spanish dynamic in respect to 
other neutral countries, whose improvements in the secondary sector prepared better 
their respective economies.  
Even before the conflict, some countries were preparing to save their economy, 
such as Norway. A few months before the conflict, this country had celebrated the 
centenary of its freedom with an exhibition of the results achieved by the industry 
in order to stimulate it and increase the moral of their citizens.51 Meanwhile, 
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Sweden and Denmark restructured their industries to adapt to the war.52 In this 
respect, the Netherlands adopted a law, Abreidswet, which allowed industries to 
work 24 hours a day, “because it provided employment and kept workers from 
smuggling at night, or going to work in Germany.”53 
In contrast, during the first years of the conflict, the Spanish government did not 
implement any measures to promote industrial development. This difference was 
repeatedly denounced by the Catalan deputies, who continued with their claims, 
although the Congress was closed, in order to raise conscience on the need to take 
advantage of the neutrality. They offered conferences and wrote a manifesto to 
request an economic reformation that would prepare the country for the 
consequences of the war.54 Both Spanish liberals and conservatives could not 
support these reforms, because they were afraid of losing the loyalty of the chiefs of 
the agricultural provinces, with great influence and opposed to the industrial 
interests. In addition, they perceived the economic demands of the Catalan MPs as a 
sovereign act. From the regionalist point of view, the situation was as it follows: 
“When the European conflict rose, Catalonia realized that neutrality would not 
release Spain from deep economic repercussions and from the beginning 
encouraged the government to take the essential measures to avoid damage and 
profit from the national economy. This patriotic action of the economic 
corporations and of all Catalan political formations, grouped together in the 
Commonwealth of Catalonia, did not obtained from the government a favourable 
reception that was worthy. It was received with foresight, as if a factious action 
was.”55 
Far from changing the course of the administration, when the parliament 
resumed its activity in 1916, the government tried to pass a law, which would affect 
industrial interests. The finance minister, Santiago Alba, wanted to implement a tax 
on war windfall profits obtained by the industry and the commerce; a project which 
would fiscally penalize the secondary sector, but would not apply the same criteria 
for the primary sector. This measure was justified by the government, since the war 
had had contradictory effects, enriching industrial sector and impoverishing the 
public treasury. Thus, the tax wanted to balance the situation.56 
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Obviously, this proposal generated a wave of protests from the industrialists and 
the Catalan deputies. Joan Ventosa, on 17 June 1916, qualified it as an economic 
monstrosity and as a criminal attempt to damage the industry in Catalonia and in the 
whole Spain. Also Cambó, the following 26 of the same month, censured the plan. 
He said the tax would slow down investment, move away capital and damage the 
production. He also considered it unfair and retroactively, which was supposed to 
be unconstitutional. This speech was followed by other parliamentary spokesmen: 
Maura, Bugallal, Juan de la Cierva, the Basque deputies and the Catalan nationalist 
lefties Rodés and Nougués, among others.57 
Faced with such opposition, the bill on the war windfall profits was not 
successful. Nevertheless, the situation remained problematic for the industrial 
sector, which still had complications to export and import. In the Sessions of the 
Congress’ Diary can be found many pleas from the Catalan deputies in order to 
reverse the situation. For instance, Manuel González Vilart, a conservative of the 
datist-wing, reported the difficulties faced by the Catalan manufacturers to import 
German needles.58 Likewise, deputies from vineyards districts, like the regionalist 
Camps’ Marquis, stated the problems farmers had to obtain sulphur and to export 
their product.59 
Later on, most Catalan deputies established a common front against the national 
reconstitution’s bill of the finance minister, Santiago Alba. The initiative was again 
not well received by the Catalan economic interests. The national reconstitution’s 
bill was based on an ambitious plan to modernize the Spanish economy, while it 
would ratify extraordinary budgets, which did not provide enough measures to 
encourage the secondary sector. Nationalist republicans and Catalan nationalist 
conservatives blocked the project with various inquiries, questions and speeches.60 
Cambó was one of the most active politicians in this field, but perhaps the most 
remarkable intervention was the one offered by Rodés on the 4th November 1916, 
when he denounced the political discredit the finance minister submitted his 
political party – republican. He also presented other proposals to modify national 
budgets through concrete measures, such as rethinking investments in hydroelectric 
power and improvements in communication networks.61 In this regard, the reformist 
Josep Zulueta was also compelling. From his point of view, the national 
reconstitution project would not do more than “rectify the fundamental mistakes of 
this administration; as the vices and corruptions of the Spanish administration have 
brought us this disaster, the causes of these great inequalities’ distribution on the 
budget and these large differences still exist in public works; and as long as they 
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exist [...] inspires me a real terror this administration, which is not redressed […] 
has now received such a large amount of millions; as before, money that will 
become lost.”62 
With this offensive, the Catalan deputies achieved their purpose and Alba’s plan 
was rejected on the 16 December 1916, also with the support of Basque nationalist 
deputies and the dynastic conservatives’ politicians. At that time, with the discredit 
of the minister and the social, political and economic crisis which impacted on the 
country, both the Regionalist League and the Catalan nationalist republicanism 
continued to put pressure on the government in order to obtain support for the 
industry. Their insistence was rewarded in the beginning of February 1917, when 
two draft laws, whose contents were favourable to Catalan economic principles, 
were presented and approved. 
The first was the law of aid to new industries and development of the existing 
ones, an initiative to encourage the creation of new industries. The government 
agreed to contribute with the 50% of the initial capital of any company that would 
like to establish itself and accomplish the necessary conditions. The second one was 
the Licensing law, which aim was to enable the government to adapt budgets to the 
needs of the various government’s departments in the exceptional circumstances of 
war.63 
It was then, when representatives from the Regionalist League joined the 
governments of national concentration of 1917 and 1918. From this position, the 
different Catalan ministers executed an extensive program of modernization of the 
national infrastructures, projecting a new network of roads and railways, developing 
a code for mining and establishing new irrigation and afforestation projects. 
Nevertheless, these initiatives were insufficient to adapt the Spanish economy to the 
reality of the conflict. In fact, the conservative Antoni de Veciana still complained 
about the troubles Catalans had to move their goods within Tarragona’s port, while 
foreign companies had more facilities.64 At the same time, the participation of the 
regionalists in the government led to discrepancies within the Catalan deputies. 
Most nationalist republicans denounced the actions of the League in the 
government, as they forgot to establish some of the demands they had previously 
made. 
Despite the poor results, the neutrality and the atmosphere that led to the war 
was a good pretext for the most critical political parties to keep alive discussion 
about the administrative and economic centralization, civil rights or representation’s 
problems. Although at a different level and in a different context, the process was 
similar to other neutral and non-neutral countries that were also shaken by demands 
of political regeneration. The best known of all these claims was the one for 
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universal suffrage.65 Thus, while in Spain the government did not pay much 
attention to these criticisms, the speeches here compiled facilitated to raise these 
questions within the Spanish society.  
The case exposed about the ways in which the Catalan deputies tried to achieve 
greater economic and political autonomy reveals the war was an encouraging 
context to justify regenerative claims. These MPs made constant references to the 
conflict so as to vindicate their arguments. Cambó, for instance, claimed: “the 
European war has transformed the entire economic organization of the world, has 
revealed weaknesses in the economic structure of the countries; circumspections in 
their energy not suspected, future definitive lessons. It has already been designed 
the economic struggle that will follow the warrior battle and it will be relentless and 
fiercer.”66 
Additionally, nationalist republicans such as Domingo, Rodés, Macià or Pi, 
among others, also used situations caused by the war to defend their arguments of 
decentralization. Domingo, in one of his speeches, assumed the war made his 
political party think about the way to act in front of the conflict: “At the outbreak of 
the European war, all nations had to be assessed, had to be measured, had to study 
their institutions, their bodies. We were also forced to review these values.”67 But, 
most of all, the conflagration was useful to both political parties to request the 
immediate solution of the “Catalan problem”. 
 
Conclusions 
Besides revolutionized the public opinion, in Spain the First World War also 
accelerated the crisis of the political system of the Restoration. The Parliament was 
alive than ever thanks to the dynastic opposition, which as far as possible 
encouraged the lower house to debate about the nature of neutrality. Among others, 
the Catalan deputies were one of the most interested parliamentarians in using the 
chamber to pressure the Spanish government in order to make visible their claims 
for autonomy and for promoting its model of industrial capitalism. The reaction of 
the political parties of the system was defensive. They got carried away by the usual 
inertia, using illiberal measures such as the closure of the parliamentary sessions 
and the suspension of the constitutional guarantees. Correspondingly, it is not 
entirely true that the neutrality debate in the parliament was non-existent. Moreover, 
if it was not more prolific, it was because of the confidence’s lack of the dynastic 
parties in open debates. 
In this article, we have showed how the war helped the Catalan deputies to raise 
their problem, the so-called “Catalan question”, and to bring to light political and 
                                                   
65 Angela K. Smith, Suffrage discourse in Britain during the First World War (Aldershot and Hants: 
Ashgate, 2005). 
66 SCD: 1916’s legislature, 2330. 
67 SCD: 1916’s legislature, 506. 
Borja DE RIQUER, Gemma RUBI, Laura CANALIAS I Oriol LUJÁN 
 
 
 
178 
economic shortcomings of Spain. The position of the main leaders of the 
Regionalist League, Prat de la Riba and Cambó, towards the war evolved from a 
discrete germanophilia, which became confused with a strict neutral position in 
order to open the Catalan industry to the European markets, to give support to the 
allies. This change took place when the Regionalist League published the manifesto 
For Catalonia and the big Spain in March 1916. It called for a renewed Spain, 
articulated by Iberian countries with the Catalan conservative as its engine. In other 
words, the Regionalist League wanted to leave the role of opposition party to get 
involved in the governance of the state. Nationalists Republicans, meanwhile, relied 
initially on the golden opportunity the war offered, fighting with the allies for a 
federal democratic republic, which could recognize a political autonomy for 
Catalonia. With the application of the principle of nationalities after the war and the 
refusal of the dynastic elites to the strategy described, they saw the need to 
radicalize their strategy with the Irish struggle for independence as a reference. 
Both political parties came together in the struggle for a greater economic and 
political autonomy for Catalonia. Despite the difficulties, they achieved some 
positive results with favourable laws to the Catalan industry. Indeed, unlike other 
neutral and belligerent countries, most of which had been able to react and they 
modernized their industry at the beginning of the conflict, Spain did not manage to 
do it at least until 1918, when it was too late. Therefore, the Spanish Congress, and 
the country on the whole, were completely weakened after the war, rather than 
come out stronger, as did the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Their 
different governments received more scope for actions, while parliaments were 
reinforced with authority and legitimacy. 
Politically, the Catalan demands for autonomy found no concessions. Despite 
the fact nations without state emerged then in Europe, these claims in Spain were 
rejected. However, the international context and the requests that had been made 
helped to visualize the Catalan demands. 
 
 
